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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal based on
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah;
Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl. Vol. 9, 1987);

Utah

Rule 54(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying the rulings and orders
as final and appealable; and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This is an appeal from the following findings, judgments and
orders rendered by the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, of the Eighth
Judicial District Court of Daggett County, State of Utah:

1.

The

Court's

ruling

dated

September

8,

1989,

and

subsequent Order dated September 26, 1989, striking defendant's
affirmative defenses 3 through 7 and dismissing the first cause
of action of its counterclaim. (Record at 221 and 239-41).

2.

The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, denying

defendant's motion to dismiss. (Record at 145-51).

1

3.

The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, granting

plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy. (Record
at 145-51).

These rulings and orders were certified as final appealable
orders

pursuant

Procedure

to

Rule

54(b)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

in an order granting defendant's motion to certify

dated December 5, 1989. (Record at 288-89)

A Notice of Appeal

was filed in the district court dated December 15, 1989. (Record
at 292-93).

The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss based
on claims that the town did not have the authority to condemn and
that the Town of Manila had not followed the proper statutory
procedures

for

condemnation.

The

court

also

granted

plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy.
defendant/appellant

seeks

to

have

the

trial

court's

the
The
order

reversed on the issue of the town's authority to condemn and to
remand for a full hearing on the merits as to the issue of
whether

the

Town

has

met

the

condemnation.

2

statutory

requisites

for

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue I

Whether

the

Town

is

condemnation, real property

prohibited
located

from

acquiring

by

outside of its corporate

boundaries for a sewage lagoon.

Issue II

Whether municipalities classified as "Towns" are excluded
from the delegation

of the power to condemn under the Utah

Constitution.

Issue III

Whether
interest

the

statutory

in real property

power

to

acquire

a

fee

simple

is limited by statute to specific

purposes which do not include the purpose presented here.

Issue IV

Whether the Town has failed to satisfy conditions precedent
to condemnation.
3

Issue V

Whether

the

Town's

right

to

condemn

can

finally

be

determined only after a trial on the merits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

Action was brought in the Eighth Judicial District Court by
the

Town

condemn

of
land

Manila
owned

(hereafter
by

"Town11

Broadbent

and

Land

"Respondent") , to
Company

(hereafter

"Broadbent" and "Appellant"), located in Daggett County, Utah.
Following the filing of its Complaint, the Town moved for an
Order of Immediate Occupancy pending a trial on the merits of
the case.

Broadbent filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the

Town's power to condemn.

B.

Disposition in the Trial Court.

The Motions came on for hearing before the District Court on
June 29, 1989.

The Court received evidence and heard testimony

only on those issues surrounding the Town's prima facie burden of
proof on the Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy.
4

The

Motion to Dismiss was argued based solely on the authorities
cited in the Memorandums in Support of and in Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss.

No evidence was received on the issue of the

Town's power to condemn.

This evidentiary issue was specifically

reserved on the record for a trial on the merits.

Following the

hearing limited to the Order of Immediate Occupancy, the Court
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granted the
Motion

for

the

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy

and

denied

Broadbent's Motion to Dismiss,

On July 21, 1989, Broadbent filed an Amended Answer and
Counterclaim

raising various affirmative

defenses.

The Town

subsequently filed a Motion to Strike the Affirmative Defenses
and to dismiss several of the counterclaims on August 1, 1989.
Broadbent

filed a Memorandum

in Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss the Counterclaim and to Strike the Affirmative Defenses
on August 23, 1989.
dispositive

Ruling

On September 8, 1989, the Court made a
denying

Broadbent's

Motion

to

Strike

the

Town's Reply Memorandum and granting the Town's Motion to Strike
Broadbent's Affirmative Defenses 3 through 7 and to Dismiss the
First Cause of Action of Broadbent's Counterclaim.

Broadbent filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting Judge Draney to Certify his
5

Findings, Rulings and Orders as Final and Appealable Orders as
provided
Court.

for in Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Judge Draney granted Broadbent's Motion to Certify and an

Order Granting the Motion was entered on December 5, 1989.

Based

upon the Order Granting the Motion to Certify, a Notice of Appeal
was filed in the District Court dated December 15, 1989.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

The Town brought an action on or about March 22, 1989,

to condemn Broadbent's real property for the installation and
construction

of a "total containment lagoon" for disposal of

waste water and sewage.

(Record at 1, f

1) .

The Town then

sought an order of immediate occupancy which was granted over
Broadbentfs

objection.

(Record

at

9 and

149; transcript

of

hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 5-25).

2.

The property which the Town has condemned

is prime

agricultural land adjacent to Flaming Gorge National Recreation
Area, ("Property").

(Record at 126, 5 3).
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3.
boundaries

The

Property

is

of the Town

located

outside

of Manila and

of

the

municipal

is in Daggett County.

(Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 19,
lines 22-23).

4.

This farmland is part of a larger contiguous parcel of

land which is currently producing alfalfa.

(Record at 126, f 4;

transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 213,
lines 10-18).

5.

The condemnation will take a minimum of thirty acres of

prime agricultural farmland out of production.

(Record at 127, f

10; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page
155, lines 5-12).

6.
zone

The condemnation includes a one-thousand foot buffer

surrounding

building

purpose

the

Property which

and

which

was

not

cannot be used
included

for any

in the Town's

appraised value which was the basis for the required deposit paid
into

Court.

(Transcript

of

hearing

on

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy, page 47, lines 15-25; page 48 lines 1-3; page 191
lines 4-24).
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7.

Furthermore, the total containment sewage lagoon will

damage the value of the remaining Property.
9).

This

severance

damage

is

not

(Record at 127, 5

included

in

the

amount

deposited with the Court by the Town. (Transcript of hearing on
Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 43, lines 22-25).

8.

The

Property

is unique given

its proximity

to the

Flaming Gorge National Recreational Area because it is producing
farmland in Daggett County which is largely barren.

(Record at

127, 55 11-12).

9*

Appellant was never asked nor given an opportunity to

accompany an appraiser during any inspection of the Property.
(Record at 126, 5 6; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate
Occupancy, page 194, lines 7-14).

10.

Prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter,

neither Broadbent nor any other officer, agent or representative
was given an offer of just compensation in any amount for the
Property. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy,
page 52, lines 18-22).
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11.

Prior to the filing of this action Broadbent was never

given an appraisal or a written statement and summary in any
amount as just compensation for the Property and/or damage to the
remainder which will be caused by the condemnation.

(Record at

12 6, 5 7; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy,
page 41, lines 5-7; page 52 lines 23-25; page 61, lines 9-11;
page 194, lines 15-24).

nor

12.

Broadbent has never been given any notice by the Town,

any

agent

or

representative

of the Town, of the basic

protections provided by the Utah Relocation Assistance Act (Utah
Code Ann., §§ 57-12-1 et seq.). (Transcript of hearing on Order
of Immediate Occupancy, page 41, lines 14-22; page 52, lines 417; page 62, lines 10-13).
or

representative

of

Furthermore, no other officer, agent

Broadbent

has been

given

such notice.

(Record at 127, \ 8).

13.
location

At least three alternative sites are available for the
of

the

lagoon.

The

alternative

sites have

fewer

environmental problems and will be more economical to develop.
(Record at 114-16; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate
Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12).
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14.
which

Alternative

can be

facility

and

located
which

treatment

also

available

on the site of the existing

treatment

will

processes

not

require

are

the

acquisition

of

additional land outside the boundaries of the Town or require a
buffer

area.

(Transcript

of

hearing

on

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12)•
alternative processes are also less costly.

The

(Record at 114-16;

transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 2 04,
lines 4-25; page 204, lines 1-10).

15.

The sewage lagoon has been identified as a possible

threat to bird species which inhabit the area the Town seeks to
condemn and occupy (Site #2)'.

(Record at 118-19, f 11 a - d) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Point I

The

Town

cannot

acquire

by

condemnation,

real

property

located outside of its corporate boundaries for a sewage lagoon.
A municipal-owned sewer system is statutorily classified as an
"improvement."

Even if the town could be considered to be a

city, which it cannot, a city's power to acquire property by

10

condemnation

for an "improvement" as that term is defined by

statute, is limited to property within its corporate limits.

Point II

The

power

of

condemnation

has

not

been

specifically

delegated by the Utah Constitution to municipalities classified
by statute as "Towns."
is, therefore, a "town."

Manila has 800 or less inhabitants and
The power of condemnation is conferred

only upon cities by the Utah Constitution.

The words "cities"

and "towns" are mutually exclusive as used in Art. XI, § 5 of the
Utah Constitution.

Because Manila is classified as a town, it

has no constitutional power of condemnation.

The District Court

erred in finding that the Town has the authority to condemn.

Point III

The statutory power to acquire a fee simple interest in
real property is limited by statute to specific purposes.

A

sewage lagoon is not among the purposes for which fee title may
be acquired. The power to condemn property must be derived from a
statute which is to be strictly construed.

The Constitution

limits the delegation of the power by statute.

Even if the

Constitution extended the power to condemn property to towns,
11

which it does not, this statutory limitation on estates which may
be taken would limit the town to acquiring an easement rather
than fee simple title.

Point IV

The Town has
condemnation.

failed

to satisfy

conditions precedent to

The Utah Relocation Assistance Act sets forth

specific requirements which must be complied with by state or
local governments prior to initiating condemnation proceedings
when federal funds are used.

The Town's Complaint failed to

allege and show that it had complied with the policies of the
Act.

Additionally, the Town failed to comply with the statutory

requirements for condemnation.
that

the

taking

of

The Town has never established

Broadbent's

land

was

necessary

for the

construction of a sewage lagoon, nor that the construction and
use of the property would commence within a reasonable time
after initiation of condemnation proceedings.

These conditions

are statutorily required to be met before a taking.

The

Town

also

failed

to

comply

with

requirements for its Order of Immediate Occupancy.

the

statutory

Specifically,

the Town failed to prove, by affidavit or otherwise, the damage
which would accrue from the condemnation, and the reasons for
12

requiring a speedy occupation of Broadbent's land, all of which
is required by statute.

Point V

The Town's right to condemn can finally be determined only
after a trial on the merits. The court made its findings in the
hearing on the Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy.

The

trial court never granted appellant a full evidentiary hearing on
the Town's powers of condemnation.

Utah law states that the

right to condemn can finally be determined only after a trial on
the merits, not at a hearing
Immediate

Occupancy.

on a Motion

The trial

court must be reversed

Broadbent allowed an opportunity for a trial.
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for an Order of
and

ARGUMENT

Point I

THE TOWN CANNOT ACQUIRE BY CONDEMNATION.
REAL PROPERTY LOCATED OUTSIDE OF ITS
CORPORATE BOUNDARIES FOR A SEWAGE LAGOON

Broadbent's

Property,

which

is

the

subject

of

this

condemnation, is located outside the corporate boundaries of the
Town.

The Property is located at some distance from the Town

within the jurisdictional boundaries of Daggett County.
II

of

this

Constitution

brief,
has

the
not

condemnation upon towns.

argument

is

expressly

advanced

conferred

that
the

In Point
the Utah
power

of

Without conceding the issue of whether

the Town has the constitutional power to condemn, that power if
any, cannot be extended beyond the corporate boundaries of the
Town.

In Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950), the issue
on appeal was whether the Board of Education of Salt Lake City
had been given the authority by the legislature to condemn land
outside

the

limits

of

Salt

Lake

constructing a school building.
14

City

for

the

purpose

of

Under the facts of that case,

the property sought to be condemned was situated in part within
the boundaries of Salt Lake Cityf and part within the boundaries
of Salt Lake County.
boards

of

education

On review, the Supreme Court stated that
have only

such powers

as are

expressly

conferred upon them by statute and such implied powers as are
necessary to execute and carry into effect their express powers.
In reviewing

this power, the court noted that the right of

eminent domain

is in derogation of the rights of individual

property owners and, therefore, has been strictly construed so
that

no

person

will

be wrongfully

enjoyment of his property.
territorial

power

of

deprived

of the use and

The court found that the extra-

condemnation

of

property

outside

the

district was not expressly granted by statute and that it could
not be impliedly conferred.

In reaching this decision, the court

relied on the principle of law that statutes conferring the
rights of eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of
the landowner.

The

Supreme

dealing with

Court

noted

in

the extraterritorial

Bertaqnoli,
extension

several

of the power to

condemn for the purpose of establishing waterworks.
noted

that

in

those

cases,

it

was

cases

impossible

to

The Court
locate a

sufficient supply of water within the municipal limits.

Noting

the distinction between cities and towns in Point II, cities are
15

specifically granted extraterritorial control over waterworks in
Utah Code Ann., § 10-8-15,

This statute distinguishes among

cities of the first class (100,000 or more inhabitants) and other
classes.

Cities of the first class have jurisdiction over the

entire watershed.

All other classes are restricted to an area

fifteen miles from the point of diversion and for a distance of
three hundred feet on each side of the stream.

The opposite analogy applies here.

The Town currently has a

sewage treatment plant within its corporate boundaries.

The Town

can retrofit, expand and modify this facility to meet its needs.
Moreover, sufficient land exists within the boundaries of the
Town to site a sewage lagoon.

The cases cited in Bertaqnoli,

where the power of condemnation was extended beyond corporate
limits for necessary purposes can, therefore, be distinguished on
the facts.

Noting the distinction between the powers granted by the
Utah Constitution to cities and towns as more fully described in
Point

II; Article

XI,

§

5(b)

and

(c)

of

the

Constitution

describes the power of condemnation conferred on cities with the
following important differences:

16

(b)
To furnish all local public services, to
purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain or operate, or
lease public utilities local in extent and use; to
acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or
without the corporate limits, property necessary for
any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by
general law for the protection of other communities,
and to grant local public utility franchises and within
its powers regulate the exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire
by condemnation, or otherwise, property within its
corporate limits necessary for such improvements; and
also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess
property with restrictions, in order to protect and
preserve the improvement.
Under subparagraph (b) a city has authority to condemn property
within or without its corporate boundaries; under subparagraph
(c) a city may acquire property by condemnation only within its
corporate 1imits.

Under

Utah

Code

Ann.,

§

10-16-4,

the

legislature

has

categorized a municipal-owned sewer system as an "improvement":
"(1) the governing body of any municipality shall have power to
make or cause to be made any one or more or combination of the
following

improvements

. . . (c) to construct, reconstruct,

extend, maintain or repair . . . sewers . . ." .

It must also be noted that Utah Code Ann. , §§ 78-34-1 et
sea. , the authority relied on by the Town in its Complaint, does
not expressly extend the power of eminent domain outside the
17

boundaries of a political subdivision.

Because a sewer system is

a public improvement, only property located within the boundaries
of a city may be acquired by condemnation for that purpose.

Article XI § 5(b) specifically restricts the purposes for
which a city may exercise the power of condemnation beyond its
corporate limits.

Under the precedent established in Bertaqnoli,

the power to condemn property outside city boundaries is limited
to

those

purposes

specified

and

cannot

be

expanded

by

implication.

Assuming, for the limited purpose of analysis and

comparison,

without

acknowledging

that

the

Town

has

been

conferred the same powers as a city, the Town cannot condemn
property located outside of its corporate boundaries for a sewage
lagoon.

18

Point II

THE POWER OF CONDEMNATION HAS NOT BEEN
SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
TO MUNICIPALITIES CLASSIFIED BY STATUTES AS "TOWNS".

A.

The Classification of Towns,

Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution provides:

Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be
created by special laws.
The legislature by general
laws shall provide for the classification of cities and
towns in proportion to population, which laws may be
altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or
town may frame and adopt a charter for its own
government in the following manner: . . .
Repl. Vol. 41A, Utah Code Annotated (1953) (emphasis added).
In accordance with the first paragraph of Article XI, § 5,
the

legislature

population.

must

classify

cities

and

towns

based

upon

It follows, therefore, that the legislature can

determine the minimum population required to be a city and hence
the minimum population required for the constitutional authority
to condemn property.
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The classification of cities and towns is found in Utah
Code Ann., § 10-2-301,
The municipalities referred to in this act now existing
or hereafter organized shall be divided into cities of
the first class, cities of the second class, cities of
the third class and towns.
Those municipalities
having 100,000 or more inhabitants shall be cities of
the first class, and those municipalities having 60,000
or more inhabitants and less than 100,000 shall be
cities of the second class, those municipalities having
800 or more inhabitants and less than 60,000 shall be
cities of the third class and all municipalities having
less than 800 inhabitants shall be towns; . . .
Repl. Vol. 2A, Utah Code Annotated (1986) (emphasis added).
The Town has 800 or less inhabitants and therefore must be
classified as a "town."

The caption in the Complaint filed by

the Town also states that it is a town.

B.

The Power of Condemnation is Limited.

Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution outlines the power
conferred upon cities by the State Constitution.

That section

provides in part:
The power to be conferred upon cities by this section
shall include the following: . . . (b) to furnish all
public services, to purchase, hire, construct, own,
maintain or operate, or lease, public utilities local
in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation or
otherwise, within or without the corporate limits,
property necessary for such purposes, subject to
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection
of other communities; and to grant local public utility
franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise
thereof.
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(c) to make local public improvements and to acquire by
condemnation or otherwise, property within its
corporate limits necessary for such improvement; and
also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess
property with restrictions, in order to protect and
preserve the improvement. . .
Repl. Vol. 1A, Utah Code Annotated (1953) (emphasis added).
The

word

"town"

is

not

used

in

this

constitutional

delineation of the powers of condemnation.

The words "cities" and "towns" are mutually exclusive as
used

in Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution.

At the

beginning of that section both words are used, but when the
delineation
"cities"

is

of

conferred

used.

powers

is

stated,

Accordingly,

if

the

only

the

provisions

in

word
the

Constitution were to be strictly construed, "towns" could not be
included in "cities", nor would the terms be interchangeable, and
therefore no power to condemn was conferred upon towns.

The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the classification of
municipalities defines their powers.

In City of West Jordan v.

Utah State Retirement Board, 767 P.2d 530, (Utah 1988), the Court
stated:
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The classification on the basis of population
requirement to Article XI, § 5 only applies to laws
that classify municipalities for the purpose of
defining their powers and functions and directs that if
such laws make such distinctions between the powers of
various municipalities, those distinctions must be made
on the basis of population only.
Id. at 536.

In its Complaint, the Town relies on Utah Code Ann. , § 7834-1 as authority for its power to condemn.
rely

on

any

constitutional

grant

of

the

The Town does not
power

to condemn.

Because Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution acknowledges a
distinction between cities and towns and in fact uses those terms
in a mutually exclusive context, the delegation of the power to
condemn in the Constitution is limited.

Because the Respondent

is classified as a town and because towns are not specifically
identified in the Constitution, the Town has no power to condemn
Broadbentfs property.

The District Court erred in ruling that

the Town of Manila has the authority to condemn.
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Point III

THE STATUTORY POWER TO ACQUIRE A FEE SIMPLE
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY IS LIMITED BY
STATUTE TO SPECIFIC PURPOSES AND DOES NOT
INCLUDE A SEWAGE LAGOON.

A "municipality" is defined in Utah Code Ann., § 10-163(1) as a "city or town of this state."

A municipality has the

power under § 10-16-4(1)(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend,
maintain or repair . . . sewers . . . ; and (k) to acquire any
property

necessary

improvements.

or

advisable

in

order

to make

any

such

Simply because a municipality has the power to

acquire property and construct a sewer system does not mean,
however, that

it has the power to acquire such property by

condemnation.

The power to condemn property must be derived from

a statute which is to be strictly construed.

See, C.P. National

Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d

519, 523

(Utah

1981), and Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626 (Utah 1958).

This

statutory

delegation

of

power

is, however,

limited

by

the

Constitution and if it does not specifically confer the power, it
cannot be inferred or delegated by the legislature.
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Utah Code Ann,, § 78-34-1 lists the "public uses" for which
the power of eminent domain may be exercised, including: "• • .
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not
less than 10 families, or of any public building belonging to the
state or of any college or university."

This grant of eminent

domain is limited in § 78-34-2, which outlines the rights in land
which may be taken for public use.

Section 78-34-2 provides:

The following is a classification of the estates and
rights and lands subject to be taken for public use:
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or
grounds or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and
dams and permanent flooding occasioned thereby or for
an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of
debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other
place for the reduction of ores, or for solar
evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery
of minerals in solution; provided that where surface
ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other
extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over
the surface ground over such deposits.
(2)

An easement when taken for any other use.

(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation of lands,
with the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel,
stones, trees and timber, as may be necessary for some
public use.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (Emphasis added).

There is no listing of "sewerage systems" in subparagraph
(1) which exhaustively

lists those activities allowing for a

taking in fee simple.

A sewerage system, therefore, is within
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subparagraph (2) which limits a taking for any "other" use to an
easement.

Paragraph 7 of the Town's Complaint states that it " . . .
desires to acquire this property in fee simple

. ".

In

fact, the acquisition of fee simple title is a condition of the
grant

of

federal

funds

for

this

project,1

The

statute

specifically limits the estates which can be taken and the Town
can only

acquire

Constitution

an easement

extended

the

for this purpose, even if the
power

to

acquire

property

by

condemnation to towns.

Point IV

THE TOWN HAS FAILED TO SATISFY
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CONDEMNATION.

A.

The Town Failed to Comply With the Statutory Requirements
for Condemnation.
Additionally, the Town failed to comply with the statutory

requirements for condemnation. Before property can be condemned,
the condemnor must demonstrate that:
1

40 CFR 35.935-(3b)(3).
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(1)

The intended use of land is authorized by law, and

(2)

The taking is necessary for that use.

Not only has the Town failed to comply with § 78-34-9, but also,
it has failed to meet the conditions precedent to taking as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. , § 78-34-4.
never

established

that

the

taking

Specifically, the Town has
of

defendant's

land

was

necessary for the construction of a sewage lagoon, nor that the
construction and use of all the property sought to be condemned
would

commence

within

a

reasonable

time

after

initiation

of

condemnation proceedings.

In Town of Perry v. Thomas et al.. 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343
(1933),

the

municipal

corporation

public street.
was

defendants

shown

challenged

an

action

to condemn a private

lane

brought

by

a

for use as a

The defendants alleged that no public necessity

entitling

the

plaintiff

to

possession or judgment of condemnation.

an

order

of

temporary

On appeal, the Supreme

Court ruled that the public necessity for the opening of a street
within corporate boundaries was a question for determination by
the governing body of a municipality and in the absence of fraud,
bad faith or abuse of discretion, would not be disturbed by the
courts.

Here, the issue presented for review is whether the Town

abused its discretion in seeking to condemn land outside of its
corporate boundaries for a sewage lagoon.
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Other land has been evaluated and is available for use.
Building

the

impacts,

be

lagoon
more

on other

land would

economical

for

the

accomplished without unnecessary delay.

have

town,

fewer
and

adverse

could

be

While a new waste water

treatment facility may be desirable or necessary, there has never
been a showing that it is necessary to locate such a facility on
Broadbent's land.

At least three alternative sites are available

and have fewer environmental problems.

Furthermore, alternative

treatment processes are available which can be implemented at the
site

of

the

existing

treatment

facility

and which will not

require the acquisition of additional land located outside of the
Town's boundaries.

Moreover, there is sufficient land within the

Town's boundaries on which to build a new sewage lagoon.

The

availability of other sites within the corporate boundaries and
alternative treatment processes is sufficient evidence that the
Town's selection of Broadbent's land was arbitrary and subject to
careful scrutiny by the trial court.

The trial court had the duty of determining the necessity of
the taking and compliance of the statutory requisites, but did
not make

a

full

inquiry

into

these matters

and abused

discretion in granting the Order for Immediate Occupancy.
Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977).

its
See,
In

Ramoselli the Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order
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of condemnation of land to be used as a park.

The Supreme Court

found that the trial court had abused its discretion because the
plaintiff had not met its burden of proving a public necessity.

Condemnation of Broadbent's land will cause him irreparable
harm and the trial court's decision allowing such condemnation
must be reversed because there was no showing of necessity or of
compliance with the statutory requirements for condemnation.

B.

The Town Failed to Comply With the Statutory Requirements
for an Order of Immediate Occupancy and the'District Court
Erred in Granting the Motion.

The Town also failed to comply with Utah Code Ann., § 78-349 which prescribes the requisite procedures for obtaining an
order of immediate occupancy.

The Town failed to prove in the lower Court by affidavit or
otherwise, the damages which would accrue from the condemnation,
and the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation of Broadbent's
land, all of which is required under the statute.
Ann., § 78-34-9.
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See, Utah Code

Even if the Town has a right to condemn this does not "flow
automatically

into

a

right

of

immediate

occupancy;

the

requisites noted in § 78-34-9 must be met, legally vexing though
they may be to a condemnor, before it can prevail in the matter."
Utah Department of Transportation v. Hatch, 613 P. 2d 764 (Utah
1980).

Utah Code Ann.. § 78-34-9 directs the court to "grant or

refuse the motion

[for immediate occupation] according to the

equity of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to
the parties."

The

order

of

immediate

preliminary injunction.

occupancy

is

analogous

to

a

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the

moving party must demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits.

The evidence offered by the moving party does not,

however, dispense with the need for a trial on the merits.

Just

as a hearing on a preliminary injunction does not substitute for
a trial, neither does the hearing on the order of immediate
occupancy dispense with the need
issues,

including,

condemn.

The

but

not

practical

for a trial on all of the

limited

effect

of

to
the

the

Town's

Order

of

power

to

Immediate

Occupancy will be to foreclose Broadbent's ability to challenge
the Town's power to condemn extraterritorial property for the
sewage lagoon.
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C.

The Town Failed
Assistance Act,

to

Comply

With

the

Utah

Relocation

Approximately fifty-one percent (51%) of the costs of the
proposed project will be funded through a federal "design and
construction"
Agency.

grant

issued

by

the

Environmental

Protection

The Utah Relocation Assistance Act ("Act"), Utah Code

Ann. , §§ 57-12-1 et seq. sets forth specific requirements which
must be complied with by state and local governments prior to
initiating condemnation proceedings when federal funds are used.
Section 57-12-13 of the Act requires that any agency acquiring
property by "[e]minent domain or condemnation laws of this state
shall comply with the following policies":
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire
expeditiously real property by negotiation.
(2)
Real property shall be appraised before the
initiation of negotiations, and the owner or his
designated representative shall be given an opportunity
to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the
property.
(3)
Before the initiation of negotiations for real
property, an amount shall be established which is
reasonably believed to be just compensation, therefore,
and such amount shall be offered for the property. In
no event shall such amount be less than the lowest
approved appraisal of the fair market value of the
property. Any decrease or increase of the fair market
value of the real property prior to the date of
evaluation caused by the public improvement for which
such property is acquired or by the likelihood that the
property would be acquired for such improvement, other
than that due to physical deterioration within the
reasonable control of the owner, will be disregarded in
determining the compensation for the property.
The
owner of the real property to be acquired shall be
30

provided with a written statement of and summary of
the basis for the amount established as just
compensation.
Where
appropriate, the
just
compensation for real property acquired and for damages
to remaining real property shall be separately stated.
(7)
In no event shall the time of condemnation be
advanced, on negotiations or condemnation and the
deposit of funds in court for the use of the owner be
deferred, or any other coercive action be taken to
compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the
property.
(9) If the acquisition of only part of the property
would leave its owner with an uneconomic remnant, an
offer to acquire the entire property shall be made.
Repl. Vol 2A, Utah Code Annotated (1986) (Emphasis added).

The Complaint is a bare-bones pleading which simply states
that

the

Town

condemnation.

seeks

to

acquire

property

by

The Town failed to allege and show that it had

complied with the policies of the Act.
the testimony

Broadbent's

The Town's Complaint and

at the hearing on the Motion for an Order of

Immediate Occupancy, disclose its failure to comply with the Act
as follows:

1.

The

legal

description

of

the property

to be

condemned is set out in paragraph 3 of the Complaint and
contains 3 5 acres.
to

the

complaint

The "Condemnation Resolution" attached
refers

to

an

"approved

appraisal" of

$14,292.00 or a value of approximately $400.00 an acre as
stated in the Affidavit of K. C. Nokes. (Record at 6 and
31

27;

also,

transcript

of

hearing

on

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy, pages 179-196).

2.

Paragraph 6 of the complaint states that the

property to be condemned is "[b]ut a part of an entire
parcel or tract of the property owned by the defendant
. . . ". (Record at 2-3, 5 6).

3.

The appraisal does not recognize any value for

damage to the remaining property (severance) caused by
the taking. (Record at 11-21; transcript of hearing on
Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 43, lines 22-25).

4.

Furthermore, a 1,000 foot buffer area will

surround the proposed lagoon.

The appraisal failed to

acknowledge a value for the buffer area. (Record at 36,
5

3 and

11-21; transcript

of hearing

on Order of

Immediate Occupancy, page 47, lines 15-25; page 48,
lines 1-3; page 191, lines 4-24).

5.

Moreover, the property is located adjacent to the

Flaming Gorge National Recreation area and the appraisal
fails to recognize any diminution in value to the remaining
property

caused by the project.
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(Record at 11-21; also,

transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, pages
179-196).

The pleadings establish the Town's failure to comply with
the policies of the Act prior to its filing the action for
condemnation.
precedent

to

The Town's
a

failure to

condemnation

deprived

satisfy
the

the

conditions

district

court of

jurisdiction in the matter, and the district court erred in its
determination that it had jurisdiction.

Point V

THE TOWN'S RIGHT TO CONDEMN CAN FINALLY
BE DETERMINED ONLY AFTER A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

The proceedings in which the court made its findings was
limited to the hearing on the Motion for an Order of Immediate
Occupancy.

That Motion was granted.

An Order of Immediate

Occupancy is, however, interlocutory in nature and is not a final
appealable order. The Order should not have barred Broadbent from
contesting the Town's power to condemn at a trial on the merits.
In State v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. , 332 P.2d
92 6

(Utah 1958), the court ruled that an Order of Immediate

Occupancy

is interlocutory

in nature and that the matter of
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determining any right to condemn is one for consideration at
trial.

The Utah Supreme Court later addressed this issue in Utah

State Board Com'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted, emphasis added), stating:
An order of immediate occupancy is entered pendente
lite and only authorizes the state to take immediate
possession until a final adjudication on the merits.
An order of an immediate occupancy is nothing more than
an interlocutory order.
The statefs right to condemn, if challenged, can
finally be determined only after a trial on the merits,
not at a hearing on the motion for immediate occupancy.
Since an order for immediate occupancy only requires
prima facie proof of the right to condemn, that order
is not a final adjudication on the merits.
Res
judicata has no application in the absence of a final
adjudication.
At the hearing, Broadbent's counsel specifically reserved the
right to challenge the Town's power to condemn at the time of
trial and subsequently objected to the evidentiary basis for the
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Finally, upon

Broadbent's motion, the court certified these issues under Rule
54(b) as issues for interlocutory appeal.

The

Town

argued

in

the

District

Court

that

already been an evidentiary hearing in this case.
is without merit.

there had

This argument

The evidence presented in the hearing on the

motion for an order of immediate occupancy was a preliminary
evidentiary

hearing

limited

solely

to respondent's burden of

making a prima facie case to substantiate an order of immediate
34

occupancy.

Broadbent's

counsel

specifically

reserved

these

matters for trial on the merits.

The

Town

has

also

argued

that

the

case

at

bar

is

distinguishable from Friberq which held that a hearing on an
order

of

immediate

determining

a

state's

occupancy
right

may
to

not

be

condemn

and

the

basis

that

a

for
full

evidentiary hearing is required.

Utah State Board Com'n. v.

Friberq, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984).

See also State v. Denver and

Rio Grade Railroad, 8 Utah 20, 236, 238, 3.32 P.2d

926, 927

(1958) (State's right to condemn can finally be determined only
after a trial on the merits, not at a hearing on the Motion for
an Order

of Immediate Occupancy) .

distinguishable from Friberq.

The case

at bar

is not

Neither in Friberg, nor in the

present case was there a full evidentiary hearing.

Friberg is

clearly on point and governs the present case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse
the decision of the District Court on the issue of The Town's
authority to condemn and remand the case with instructions for a
full

evidentiary

hearing

on

35

the

conditions

precedent

to

condemnation and the Town's right to condemn property located
outside of its corporate boundaries for a sewage lagoon.

DATED this j£_

day of April, 1990.

VAN WAGONER & STEVENS

Xd^^^^-v

mey for Appellant,
Broadbent Land Company
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addressed to the following:
Clark B. Allred, Esq.
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq.
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & BUNNELL
3 63 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST
FOR ADMISSIONS OF FACT TO PLAINTIFF

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3 63 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOWN OF MANILA,
Plaintiff,

]
|
;)
)

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
OF FACT TO PLAINTIFF

vs.
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY,
Defendant.
Request No, 1:

]
]1

Civil No. 306B

Admit that the total containment lagoon site

will occupy at least thirty acres of land.
RESPONSE:
Admit.
Request No. 2:

Admit that the selected site number 2 is

located outside the boundaries of the Town of Manila.
RESPONSE:
Admit.
Request No. 3:

Admit that the 30 acre site includes more

land than will actually be used for the construction of the
treatment cells for the total containment lagoon as currently
designed.
RESPONSE:
Admit in the sense that there are lands in addition to the
lands under the lagoon itself, which lands are necessary for the

instruction, support and operation of the lagoons.
Request No. 4:

Admit that the total containment lagoon site

fill be surrounded by a 1,000 foot "buffer" or "no build" zone.
RESPONSE:
Deny.
Request No. 5:

Admit that the Town of Manila must obtain

rights of ways and/or easements for the construction and location
>f a pipeline to the total containment lagoon.
RESPONSE:
Admit.
Request No. 6:

Admit that the Town of Manila must obtain

rights of ways and/or easements for the construction, operation
ind maintenance of the total containment lagoon.
RESPONSE:
Deny.

The only easements that will be required will be for

:he trunkline.
Request No. 7:
Management

and

Admit that the "Waste Water

Financial

Plan

Addendum

Report"

Facilities

prepared

by

Palmer-Wilding dated May 1988 list the land acquisition cost in
Appendix

E

(Exhibit

"A" attached

hereto and

incorporated

by

reference herein) as 30 acres at $2,000 per acre for a total
acquisition cost of $60,000.
RESPONSE:
Admit.
Request
submitted

to

No.
the

8:
EPA

Admit

that

in

document

a

the

land

acquisition

entitled

"Waste

cost
Water

Facilities Financial Information11, (Exhibit "B" attached hereto
and incorporated by this reference) shows land acquisition costs
of $60,000.
RESPONSE:
Admit.
Request No- 9:

Admit that the "Water Pollution Control

Committee Feasibility Report Waste Water Lagoon and Enhancement
Program" (Exhibit "C" attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference) includes a cost for land acquisition of $60,000.
RESPONSE:
Admit.
Request

No.

10:

Admit that the land acquisition cost

estimates prepared for the Town do not include the 1,000 foot
"buffer" or "no build area" surrounding the total containment
lagoon site.
RESPONSE:
Admit.
DATED this j\J day of October, 1989.

riLL bun
:LARK B . ALLRED - 0055
;AYLE F . MCKEACHNIE - 2200
TIELSEN & S E N I O R

attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
63 E a s t Main S t r e e t
' e r n a l , Utah
84078
' e l e p h o n e : (801) 7 8 9 - 4 9 0 8
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
^OWN OF MANILA,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff,
vs.

5ROADBENT LAND COMPANY,

Defendant.

Civil No. 306B

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
'IRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS OF FACT TO PLAINTIFF was served this
day of October, 1989, by mailing a true and correct copy
:hereof on said date by United States nail, first class, postage
^repaid, addressed to:
Mr. Craig Anderson
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
215 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this

i ^ day of October, 19/9. f]
Clarki B. -Allred

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article XI, § 5 (b) and (c)

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ART. X I , §

Sec. 5. [Municipal corporations—To be created by general law—Eight
and manner of adopting charter for own government—Powers
included]
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special
laws. The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation,
organization and classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which laws may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated
city or town may frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the
following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its
members, and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen
per cent of all votes cast at the next preceding election for the office of
the mayor, shall forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the
electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall require that the question be submitted to the
electors at the next regular municipal election. The ballot containing such
question shall also contain the names of candidates for members of the
proposed commission, but without party designation. Such candidates shall
be nominated in the same manner as required by law for nomination of
city officers. If a majority of the electors voting on the question of choos^
ing a commission shall vote in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates
receiving a majority of the votes cast at such election, shall constitute the
charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors.of
the city at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter
commission, which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and distribution among the electors and not more than one year
from such date. Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted
upon separately. The commission shall make provisions for the distribution
of copies of the proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the
qualified electors of the city, not less than sixty days before the election
at which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and such alternative
provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon^
shall become an organic law of such'city at such time as may be fixed
therein, and shall supersede any existing charter and all laws affecting
the organization and government of such city which are now in conflict
therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter
as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and authenticated by
the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the
office of the secretary of State and the other in the office of the city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter.

Amendments to any such charter may be-framed? and submitted by a
charter commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters^
or may be proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two^
thirds vote thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal
to fifteen per cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding
election, and any such amendment may be submitted at the next regular"
municipal election, and having been approved by the majority of the
electors voting thereon, shall become part of the charter at the time fixed
in such amendment and shall be certified and filed as-provided in case
of charters.
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is
hereby granted, the authonty to exercise all powers relating to municipal
affairs, and to adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and
similar regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration
of powers in this Constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or
restrict the general grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of
authority shall not include the power to regulate public utilities, not
municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities is provided
for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the
legislature in matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws
applicable alike to all cities of the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include
the following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct,
own, maintain or operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and use;
to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the corporate
limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions
imposed by general law for the protection of other communities; and to
grant local public utility franchises and within its powers regulate the
exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, property'within its corporate limits necessary for such
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess property with
restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property,
or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or
both, including, in the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms
upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such utility.
(As amended November 8, 1932, effective January 1, 1933.)
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JUDICIAL CODE

(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax° Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g> a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utalr Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district* court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate>jurisdiction:
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57-12-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the tfUtah Relocation Assistance Act."

57-12-2. Declaration of policy.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this act and of the state of Utah, and
the Legislature recognizes:
(1) That it is often necessary for the various agencies of state and local
government to acquire land by condemnation;
(2) That persons, businesses, and farms are often uprooted and displaced by such action while being recompensed only for the value of land
taken;
(3) That such displacement often works economic hardship on those
least able to suffer the added and uncompensated costs of moving, locating new homes, business sites, farms, and other costs of being relocated;
.(4) That such added expenses should reasonably be included as a part
ofrthe project cost and paid to those displaced;
(5) That the Congress of the United States has established matching
grants for relocation assistance, and has also established uniform policies
for land acquisition under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, to assist the states in meeting these
ex
penses and assuring that land is fairly acquired;
(6) That it is in the public interest for the state of Utah to provide for
such* payments and to establish such land acquisition policies.
Therefore the purpose of this act is to establish a uniform policy for the &?
and equitable treatment of persons displaced by the acquisition of real D m£
erty by state and local land acquisition programs, by building code e X £
ment activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of buildings t
AII l m P r o v e m e n t s conducted pursuant to governmental supervision
All of the provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to put into eftW
w
the foregoing policies and purposes.
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57-12-13. Procedure for acquisition of property.
Any agency acquiring real property as to which it has the power to acquire
under the eminent domain or condemnation laws of this state shall comply
with the following policies:
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire expeditiously real
property by negotiation.
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotiations, and the owner or his designated representative shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the property.
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, an amount
shall be established which is reasonably believed to be just compensation
therefor, and such amount shall be offered for the property. In no event
shall such amount be less than the lowest approved appraisal of the fair
market value of the property. Any decrease or increase of the fair market
value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public
improvement for which such property is acquired or by the likelihood that
the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than that
due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner,
will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property.
The owner of the real property to be acquired shall be provided with a
written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount established as just compensation. Where appropriate the just compensation for
real property acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall
be separately stated.
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real property
acquired through federal or federally assisted programs before the agreed i
purchase price is paid or there is deposited with a court having jurisdiction of condemnation of such property, in accordance with applicable law,,
for the benefit of the owner an amount not less than the lowest approved i
appraisal of the fair market value of such property or the amount of the
award of compensation in the condemnation proceeding of such property.
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement shall be •
so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no person lawfully
occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling (assuming a replacement dwelling will be available) or to move his business
or farm operation without at least ninety days' written notice from the
date by which such move is required.
(6) If an owner or tenant is permitted to occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or for a period subject to termination on short notice, the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair
rental value of the property to a short-term occupier.
(7) In no event shall the time of condemnation be advanced, on negotiations or condemnation and the deposit of funds in court for the use of the
owner be deferred, or any other coercive action be taken to compel an
agreement on the price to be paid for the property.
(8) If an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the
power of eminent domain, formal condemnation proceedings shall be instituted. The acquiring agency shall not intentionally make it necessary
for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking
of his real property.
(9) If the acquisition of obly part of the property would leave its owner
with an uneconomic remnant, an offer to acquire the entire property shall
be made.
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I03£15. Waterworks — Construction — Extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
aygmay construct or authorize the construction of waterworks within or
Sutrlthe city limits, and for the purpose of maintaining and protecting the
^^^ffomT-injury and the water from pollution their jurisdiction shall extejid
^ a£i fiiie , iterritory occupied by such works, and over all reservoirs, streams,
ils,:: ditches, pipes and drains used in and necessary for the construction,
atenance and operation of the same, and over the stream or source from
Tjthe "water is taken, for fifteen miles above the point from which it is
land for a distance of three hundred feet on each side-of such stream and
liighways along such stream or watercourse within said fifteen miles and
|ffiree- hundred feet; provided, that the jurisdiction of cities of the first
fsfiall be over the entire watershed, except that livestock shall be permitjgraze beyond one thousand feet from any such stream or source; and
deck further, that each city of the first class shall provide a highway in
" augh its corporate limits, and so far as its jurisdiction extends, which
|not be closed to cattle, horses, sheep or hogs driven through any such
" ^through any territory adjacent thereto over which such city has jurisjj£but»the board of commissioners of such city may enact ordinances
??under police regulations the manner of driving such cattle, sheep,
land hogs through such city, or any territory adjacent thereto over
fiit^as jurisdiction. They may enact all ordinances and regulations nec"Tra carry the power herein conferred into effect, and are authorized and
to enact ordinances preventing pollution or contamination of the
streams or watercourses from which the inhabitants of cities derive the'
water supply, in whole or in part, for domestic and culinary purposes, and
may enact ordinances prohibiting or regulating the construction or maintenance of any closet, privy, outhouse or urinal within the area over which the
city has jurisdiction, and provide for permits for the construction and maintenance of the same. In granting such permits they may annex thereto such
reasonable conditions and requirements for the protection of the public health
as they deem proper, and may, if deemed advisable, require that all closets
privies and urinals along such streams shall be provided with effective septic
tanks or other germ-destroying instrumentalities.
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10-16-4. P o w e r s of municipality.
(1) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to make or
cause to be made any one or more or combination of the following improvements:
(a) to establish grades and lay out, establish, open, extend and widen
any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility;
(b) to improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, curb, gutter, sewer,
drain, park and beautify any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking
facility;
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, drains,
flood barriers and channels; and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain, or repair lines, facilities and equipment (other than generating
equipment) for street lighting purposes or for the expansion or improvement of a previously established municipally owned electrical distribution system, to a district within the boundaries of the municipality;
(d) to plant or cause to be planted, set out, cultivate and maintain
lawns, shade trees or other landscaping;
(e) to cover, fence, safeguard or enclose reservoirs, canals, ditches ami
watercourses and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain and repair
waterworks, reservoirs, canals, ditches, pipes, mains, hydrants, and other
water facilities for the purpose of supplying water for domestic and irrigation purposes or either, regulating, controlling or distributing the sine,
and regulating and controlling water and watercourses leading into tha
municipality;
(f) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair parking lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets;
(g) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair any of
the improvements authorized in this section for use in connection with an
industrial or research park except that this act may not be used to pay the
cost of buildings or structures used for industry or research;
(h) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair parka
and other recreational facilities;
(i) to remove any nonconforming existing improvements in the areas to
be improved;
(j) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair optional improvements;
(k) to acquire any property necessary or advisable in order to make any
of such improvements;
(1) to make any other improvements now or hereafter authorized Jbyj
any other law, the cost of which in whole or in part can properly?be
determined to be of particular benefit to a particular area within, the
municipality;
(m) to construct and install all such structures, equipment and other
items and to do all such other work as may be necessary or appropriate to
complete any of such improvements in a proper manner.
(2) For the purpose of making and paying for all or a part of the cost of any
of such improvements (including optional improvements), the governing body
of a municipality may create special improvement districts within the munici-«
pality, levy assessments on the property within such a district which is benefited by the making of the improvements and issue interim warrants and
special improvement bonds as provided in this act.
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78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised.
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may
be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:
(1) all public uses authorized by the Government of the United States.
(2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other
public uses authorized by the Legislature.
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or
incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts,
flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of any
county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams,
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for
the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants
thereof.
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads,
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and
railroads and street railways for public transportation.
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or
other works for the reduction of ores, with water 'for domestic or other
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of
lands, or for the floating of logs and himber on streams not navigable, or
for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution.
(6) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other
works for the reduction of ores, or ^om mines, quarries, coal mines or
mineral deposits including minerals i& solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal
pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection therewith such other interests in property as may be required
adequately to examine, prepare, maiAtain, and operate such underground
natural gas storage facilities; and sol^r evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in Solution; also any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines,
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores,
or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter.
(7) byroads leading from highways to residences and farms.
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and
sites for electric light and power plants.
(9) sewerage of any city or town, o r 0 f any settlement of not less than
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any
college or university.

78-34-1

(10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat.
(11) cemeteries and public parks.
(12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the manufacture of beet sugar.
(13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and
necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to take
lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes and dust
therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the
powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county
where the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the
limits of any city or incorporated town; nor unless the proposed
condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or
easement, at least seventy-five per cent in value of land acreage owned by
persons or corporations situated within a radius of four miles from the
mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the
limits of said four-mi] e radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of
land within said limit and providing for the operation of such mill,
smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall
have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter or
other works for the reduction of ores.
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10-2-301

CITIES AND TOWNS

CLASSIFICATION OF MUNICIPALITIES
10-2-301. Classification of municipalities according to
population.
The municipalities referred to in this act now existing or hereafter organized shall be divided into cities of the first class, cities of the second class,
cities of the third class and towns. Those municipalities having 100,000 or
more inhabitants shall be cities of the first class, and those municipalities
having 60,000 or more inhabitants and less than 100,000 shall be cities of the
second class, those municipalities having 800 or more inhabitants but less
than 60,000 shall be cities of the third class and all municipalities having less
than 800 inhabitants shall be towns; but this section shall not lower the class
of any municipality which now exists.
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10-16-3. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Municipality" means a city or town of this state.
(2) "Governing body" means the board of commissioners or city council
of a city or the town council of a town.
(3) "Special improvement district" or "district" means a district created
for the purpose of making improvements under this chapter.
(4) "Assessment" means a special tax levied against property within a
special improvement district to pay all or a portion of the costs of making
improvements in the district.
(5) "Bonds" or "special improvement bonds" mean bonds issued under
this chapter payable from assessments and out of the special improvement guaranty fund established as provided in this chapter.
(6) "Property" means real property or any interest in real property.
(7) "Contract price" means the amount payable to one or more contractors for the making of improvements in a special improvement district
under any contract duly let to the lowest responsible bidder or bidders as
required by this chapter, including amounts payable for extra or addi-
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10-16-4. Powers of municipality.
(1) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to make or
cause to be made any one or more or combination of the following improvements:
(a) to establish grades and lay out, establish, open, extend and widen
any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility;
(b) to improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, curb, gutter, sewer,
drain, park and beautify any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking
facility;
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, drains,
flood barriers and channels; and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain, or repair lines, facilities and equipment (other than generating
equipment) for street lighting purposes or for the expansion or improvement of a previously established municipally owned electrical distribution system, to a district within the boundaries of the municipality;
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10-16-4. Powers of municipality.
(1) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to make or
cause to be made any one or more or combination of the following improvements:
(a) to establish grades and lay out, establish, open, extend and widen
any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility;
(b) to improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, curb, gutter, sewer,
drain, park and beautify any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking
facility;
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, drains,
flood barriers and channels; and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain, or repair lines, facilities and equipment (other than generating
equipment) for street lighting purposes or for the expansion or improvement of a previously established municipally owned electrical distribution system, to a district within the boundaries of the municipality;
(d) to plant or cause to be planted, set out, cultivate and maintafi*
lawns, shade trees or other landscaping;
(e) to cover, fence, safeguard or enclose reservoirs, canals, ditches aiki
watercourses and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain and repair
waterworks, reservoirs, canals, ditches,' pipes, mains, hydrants, and other
water facilities for the purpose of supplying water for domestic and irriga^
tion purposes or either, regulating, controlling or distributing the same
and regulating and controlling water and watercourses leading into the
municipality;
(f) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair parking lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets;
(g) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair any of
the improvements authorized in this section for use in connection with an
industrial or research park except that this act may not be used to pay the
cost of buildings or structures used for industry or research;
(h) 10 acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair parks
and other recreational facilities;
(i) to remove any nonconforming existing improvements in the areas to
be improved;
(j) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair optional im-j
provements;
(k) to acquire any property necessary or advisable in order to make any
of such improvements;
(1) to make any other improvements now or hereafter authorized ^by
any other law, the cost of which in whole or in part can properly*bfe
determined to be of particular benefit to a particular area within, the.
municipality;
(m) to construct and install all such structures, equipment and other
items and to do all such other work as may be necessary or appropriate to
complete any of such improvements in a proper manner.
(2) For the purpose of making and paying for all or a part of the cost of any
of such improvements (including optional improvements), the governing body
of a municipality may create special improvement districts within the municipality, levy assessments on the property within such a district which is benefited by the making of the improvements and issue interim warrants and
special improvement bonds as provided in this act.
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78-34-2- Estates and rights that may be taken.
The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to
be taken for public use:
(1) a fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for
permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of
debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduction
of ores, or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery
of minerals in solution; provided that where surface ground is underlaid
with minerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface ground
over such deposits.
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use.
(3) the right of entry upon, and occupation of lands, with the right to
take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be
necessary for some public use.
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county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams,
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for
the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants
thereof.
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads,
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and
railroads and street railways for public transportation.
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or
other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of
lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or
for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution.
(6) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other
works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or
mineral deposits including minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal
pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection therewith such other interests in property as may be required
adequately to examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such underground
natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines,
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores,
or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter.
(7) byroads leading from highways to residences and farms.
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and
sites for electric light and power plants.
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any
college or university.
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78-34-4. Conditions precedent to taking.
Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use;
(3) that construction and use of all property sought to be condemned
will commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after
the initiation of proceedings under this chapter, and
»
(4) if already appropriated to some public use, that the publicr use to
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
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78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action — Deposit
paid into court — Procedure for payment of compensation.
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required, The court or a judge
thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75/%
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to
be condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion
only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of
the just compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the
parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and
awarded as provided in § 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and
the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation^awarded,
interest at the rate of 8/% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the
value of the property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession
thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date
of judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have
been paid into court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court
shall order the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to
a defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the compensation finally awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall
exceed the amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment
against the plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency* If the amount of money
so received by the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the
court shall enter judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess.
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the
time within which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall
be required to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such
orders in respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and
other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 54(b)
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and Uabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.

RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Rule 3(a)
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RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from all final orders and
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal
of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of
attorneys fees.
(b) J o i n t or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order of a district court and their interests are such
as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal, or may
join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Such joint appeals may thereafter proceed and be treated as a single
appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by
order of the Supreme Court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or
by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent. The title of the action
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the Supreme Court. In original proceedings in the Supreme Court the party making the original application shall be known as the
plaintiff and any other party as the defendant.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate that the appeal is taken to the Supreme Court.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at his last known
address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
separate or joint notice of appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal
shall pay to the clerk of the district court such filing fees as are established by
law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court. The clerk
of the district court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing and
docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith transmit one copy 9f the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the Supreme Court. Upon receipt of the
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the Supreme
Court shall thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be
docketed under the title given to the action in the district court, with the
appellant identified as such, but if such title does not contain the name of the
appellant, such, name shall be added to the title.

RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Rule 4
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RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: (1) for
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the district court by any party:
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal upon.motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance
with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the
motion, whichever occurs later.
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(3)

§ 35.935-7

Environmental Protection Agency

(d) The Regional Administrator may
include special conditions in the grant
or administer this subpart in the
manner which he determines most appropriate to coordinate with, restate,
or enforce NPDES permit terms and
schedules.
§ 35.935-2 Procurement

(c) With respect to real property acquired with EPA grant assistance, the
grantee must defer acquisition of such
property until approval of the Regional Administrator is obtained under
§ 35.940-3.
§35.935-4 Step 2+3 projects.

A grantee which has received step
2+3 grant assistance must make submittals required by § 35.920-3(c), together with approvable user charge
and industrial cost recovery systems
and a preliminary plan of operation.
The Regional Administrator shall give
written approval of these submittals
before advertising for bids on the step
3 construction portion of the step 2+3
project. The cost of step 3 work initiat§ 35.935-3 Property.
(a) The grantee must comply with ed before such approval is not allowthe property provisions of § 30.810 et able. Failure to make the above subseq. of this subchapter with respect to mittals as required is cause for invokall property (real and personal) ac- ing sanctions under § 35.965.
quired with project funds.
§35.935-5 Davis-Bacon and related stat(b) With respect to real property (inutes.
cluding easements) acquired in connecBefore
soliciting bids or proposals
tion with the project, whether such
property is acquired with or in antici- for step 3-type work, the grantee must
pation of EPA grant assistance or consult with the Regional Administrasolely with funds furnished by the tor concerning compliance with DavisBacon and other statutes referenced
grantee or others:
(1) The acquisition must be conduct- in § 30.415 et seq. of this subchapter.
ed in accordance with Part 4 of this
§ 35.935-6 Equal employment opportunity.
chapter;
Contracts involving step 3-type work
(2) Any displacement of a person by
or as a result of any acquisition of the of $10,000 or more are subject to equal
real property shall be conducted under employment opportunity requirethe applicable provisions of Part 4 of ments under Executive Order 11246
(see Part 8 of this chapter). The grantthis chapter; and
(3) The grantee must obtain (before ee must consult with the Regional Adinitiation of step 3 construction), and ministrator about equal employment
must thereafter retain, a fee simple or opportunity requirements before issusuch estate or interest in the site of a ance of an invitation for bids where
step 3 project, and rights of access, as the cost of construction work is estithe Regional Administrator finds suf- mated to be more than $1 million or
ficient to assure undisturbed use and where required by the grant agreepossession for the purpose of construc- ment.
tion and operation for the estimated
life of the project. If a step 3 project § 35.935-7 Access.
serves more than one municipality,
The grantee must insure that EPA
the grantee must insure that the par- and State representatives will have
ticipating municipalities have, or will access to the project work whenever it
have before the initiation of step 3 is in preparation or progress. The
construction, such interests or rights grantee must provide proper facilities
in land as the Regional Administrator for access and inspection. The grantee
finds sufficient to assure their undis- must allow the Regional Administraturbed utilization of the project site tor, the Comptroller General of the
for the estimated life of the project.
United States, the State agency, or

The grantee and party to any subagreement must comply with the applicable
provisions
of
§§35.935
through 35.939 with respect to procurement for step 1, 2, or 3 work. The
Regional Administrator will cause appropriate review of grantee procurement to be made.
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOWN OF MANILA
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CERTIFY RULING
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
AS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY

Civil No. CV306B
Defendant.
Judge Dennis L. Draney

Based upon Defendant, "Broadbent Land Company's Motion for
an Order Certifying the Court's Ruling dated September 8, 1989,
and

Order

striking

defendant's

affirmative

defenses

and

dismissing the first cause of action of its counterclaim;

the

Findings and Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss;

the

Findings and Order granting plaintiff's Motion for an Order of
Immediate Occupancy;

and after reviewing the Memoranda and

Points and Authorities submitted by counsel for the parties and
being fully advised therein;

EXHIBIT V

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that pursuant
to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no
just reason for delaying its appeal and, therefore, defendant,
Broadbent Land Companyfs Motion to Certify be and hereby is
granted and that the following Rulings and Judgments are final
appealable Judgments and Orders as provided for in Rule 3(a) of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court:
1.

The

Courtfs Ruling

subsequent

Order

dated

September

striking

8, 1989, and

defendant's

affirmative

defenses 3 through 7 and dismissing the first cause
of action of its counterclaim,
2.

The Findings and Order denying defendant's Motion to
Dismiss dated July 12, 1989.

3.

The Findings and Order entered by the Court granting
plaintiff's

Motion

for

an

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy dated July 12, 1989.

DATED this Sfn day of December, 1989.
BY THE COURT

(\>^^^>^^

Dennis L. Draney
District Court JudgeL
501.BDB

NLL uuri
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84 078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOWN OF MANILA,

]
1
]I
)

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF
GRANTING ORDER OF
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY

vs.
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY,
1

Defendant.

Civil No. 306B

The above captioned matter having come before the Court on
June 29, 1989 pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion and the Court's
Order

to

Show

Cause

Immediate Occupancy.
Clark

B.

Allred

regarding

the

issuance of an Order of

Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys,

and

Gayle

F.

McKeachnie.

Defendant

represented by its attorney, Craig W. Anderson,
called and testimony was received.

was

Witnesses were

The Court also received legal

Memoranda and oral argument from counsel regarding the issues.
The Court hereby makes the following Findings
FINDINGS
1.

Before the Court can grant the request for an Order of

Immediate Occupancy the Plaintiff must prove that the conditions
of Utah Code Ann- §78-34-4 and §38-34-9 have been met.
2.
including

§3 8-4-4(1) has been complied with in that Utah law,
Utah

Code

Ann.

§10-8-14,

§10-8-38

and

§10-16-4

FYHIRIT'c*

authorize the construction of wastewater treatment systems by
towns.
3.
the

Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4(2) has been complied with and

evidence

construct

shows

that

it was

necessary

for

the town to

a new wastewater treatment facility.

The present

system of the Town of Manila is failing and needs to be replaced.
The specific details of the problems with the present system are
set forth in Exhibit 10, at page 2.
4.

The

property
the

that

Plaintiff

installation

seeks

to

condemn

of the wastewater

is

necessary

for

treatment

facility.

It is not necessary that the Plaintiff nor the Court

find that the town has selected, the best or only alternative
site.

The facts show that the site selected by the town, is a

result of careful, significant studies by its engineers, which
studies have been reviewed and approved by both the state and
federal

government.

There

is

no

showing

that

the town's

selection of the site nor the system it proposes to be used has
been a result of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, but
rather has been based on substantial studies and is reasonable.
5.

Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4(3) has been complied with in

that the facility's plans have been completed, funding has been
granted

and

property and

Plaintiff

plans

to

start design work.

immediately

enter

upon the

Upon gaining access to the

property it anticipates the design work will completed within two
to four months and that construction work will immediately begin
2

and be completed within six months•
6.

Utah

Code Ann. §78-34-4(4)

is inapplicable to this

factual situation.
7.
met.
of

The requirements of Utah Code Ann, §78-34-9 have been

The facts showed that Plaintiff needs immediate occupancy
the

property

to

proceed

construction of the project.

with

design

engineering

and

Plaintiff has available funding for

the project through a grant and an interest free loan.

One

deadline has passed on those funds and the other deadline is
rapidly approaching.

Those funds are still available as a result

of the good graces of the government entities granting those
funds,

but

continued

delay

will

jeopardized

those

funds.

Furthermore, the present system is a threat to public health, is
violating the discharge permit and needs to be replaced.
8.

The testimony of Defendant's expert, Mr. Oakey, was

helpful to the Court, including information that the proposed
project is reasonable.
9.

The

$14,000.00.

Plaintiff's

appraisal

values

the

property

75% of that amount is $10,500.00.

DATED this/5^day of July, 1989.
Dennis L. Draney
District Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UINTAH

)
) ss.
)

JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR,
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served
the attached FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF GRANTING ORDER OF IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY upon counsel by sending a true and correct copy thereon
in an envelope addressed to:
Mr. Craig W. Anderson
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
215 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the//

day

of July, 1989.
J^tfae Cook
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of July,

1989.
_.
My ^commission expires:
^

Notarv^Pfiblic
/
^Notary^lPlblic
Residing/at Vernal, Utah

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3 63 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOWN OF MANILA,

}
>
]1
I

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS

vs.
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY,
1

Defendant.
This

matter

having

come

Civil No. 3 06B

before

the

Court pursuant

to

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint dated June
26, 1989,
^forth

in

The Court heard oral argument on the legal issues set
the

Motion

and

also

received

evidence

regarding

compliance with the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code
Ann. §57-12-1.

The Court being fully advised makes the following

Findings.
FINDINGS
1.

Defendant

has

not

given

to

the

Court

sufficient

reasons, either legal or factual, why the Plaintiff does not have
power to condemn.
cited by the

The constitutional and statutory provisions

Defendant do not prevent the town from having

condemnation powers.

The Eminent Domain statute, §78-34-1, et.

seq. , specifically provides that towns do have eminent domain

EXHIBITS

powers for sewer systems.

To prevent the town from condemning

would be in conflict to the obligations and duties placed on
towns to provide for the health and safety of its citizens and
town's authority to provide wastewater systems for its citizens.
2.
fee

The language in §78-34-2 regarding the power to condemn

simple

title

for

public

grounds

and

reservoirs

is

sufficiently broad to allow the Town of Manila to condemn, in fee
simple, the property upon which it seeks to build its wastewater
treatment lagoons.
3.

J.R. Broadbent, the managing partner of the Defendant,

has known of the proposal of the town to construct a new sewer
lagoon system

since its inception.

He was contacted at the

beginning by engineers seeking authority to go on his property to
dig test pits,

percolation pits and otherwise determine the

feasibility of various sites.

When the engineers had selected

the site numerous attempts were made by the town, through its
agents, to contact the Defendant and to negotiate the purchase of
the property.

Defendant has been or has had every reasonable

opportunity to be fully acquainted with the process since the
beginning and to be fully aware of the project and the steps that
have been taken.
4.

J.R. Broadbent has been invited to go on the property

with agents of the Plaintiff.

An appraisal was done.

J.R.

Broadbent was aware of the appraisal, the amount of the appraisal
and discussed the appraisal with agents of Manila Town indicating
that he did not consider it to be high enough.
2

5.

J.R. Broadbent's insistence in all contacts, either by

Mr- Broadbent or his attorneys, with agents of Plaintiff was that
the lagoons be built on a different site.

He refused to discuss

the question of price.
6.

All the purposes of the Relocation Assistance Act have

been met

by

the

Plaintiff

to

take

Plaintiff.
any

other

It would have been futile by
steps

regarding

appraisals

or

negotiation of value due to Defendant's refusal to discuss those
issues with the Plaintiffs or even to meet with and discuss with
the Plaintiff the acquisition of the property.
7.

Plaintiff has substantially complied with the terms of

the Relocation Assistance Act and have done all things required
by the Act which Defendant would allow it to do.
The Court having made the above Findings, hereby;
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES

that Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is denied.
DATED this/^^day of July, 1989.
Dennis L. Draney
District Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UINTAH

)
) ss.
)

JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR,
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served
the attached FINDINGS AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS upon
counsel by sending a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope
addressed to:
Mr. Craig W. Anderson
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
215 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the //
of July, 1989.

day

'•[1W.P^
J/U£lae Cook
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of July,

1939
My commission expires:
/)
, *

Notary/ Public
Residing at Vernal, Utah

v « a

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3 63 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOWN OF MANILA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
>
]

ORDER

;

BROADBENT LAND COMPANY,
Defendant.

1

Civil No. CV306B

The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff's Motion

to Dismiss and to Strike and Defendant's

Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum.

The Court having

reviewed the Motions, the Memoranda and being fully advised,
hereby;
ORDERS as follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Strike is denied.

Defendant has

not shown any prejudice was caused by the delay in filing the
response.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and to Strike is granted.

The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing, received legal Memoranda
from "the parties and has ruled upon the issues presented in the
First Cause of Action in Defendant's Counterclaim and the Third,
Fourth, Fifth

and

Sixth Affirmative Defenses in the Amended

EXHIBIT 'K

Answer.

The Court intended t h a t Order t o be d i s p o s i t i v e of those

issues.
3.

I t i s hereby Ordered t h a t the F i r s t Cause of Action in

Defendant's Counterclaim i s dismissed and the Third Affirmative
Defense,

Fourth Affirmative

Defense,

Fifth Affirmative

Defense

and Sixth Affirmative Defense in Defendant's Amended Answer are
hereby s t r i c k e n .
DATED t h i s X^

day of September, 1989.
Dennis L. Draney
D i s t r i c t Judge

^617/S;

:<y^°

~0-S

<&

MAILING CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UINTAH

)
) ss.
)

JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR,
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served
the attached ORDER upon counsel by sending a true and correct
copy thereon in an envelope addressed to:
Mr. Craig W* Anderson
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
215 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the/4/

day

of September, 1989.
Zy^Nae Cook
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1989/
My commission expires:

v - an- <?n

day of September,

Notary Public /
Residing at Vernal, Utah

?

